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Abstract 
 
We provide an assessment of the IMF suggestion, based on Severo (2012), to use 
an index of systemic liquidity risk (SLRI) that could help to estimate a Pigouvian 
tax on large banks for the externality on the international banking system out of 
their risk exposure. To this end we compute a parsimonious and fully documented 
SLRI and investigate its statistical significance in explaining level and variability 
of stock returns for a group of large international banks during the subprime 
financial and the Eurozone sovereign debt crises. The empirical investigation 
consistently fails to detect, within and across the two crises, a core group among 
the systemically important banks listed by the Financial Stability Board and thus 
supports a sceptical assessment of the proposal.  
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1. Introduction  
The financial crisis ignited in 2007 in the US subprime mortgage market 
was magnified and internationally transmitted because of an unprecedented 
liquidity stress especially in the aftermath of the mid-September 2008 Lehman’s 
default. This brought to the forefront the manifold features of liquidity, namely 
the feedbacks between funding and market liquidity (e.g. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009), and the role played by the scarcity of liquidity in compromising 
banks’ and other financial institutions’ solvency (e.g. Brunnermeier, 2009). As a 
consequence, policy makers were pushed to take these aspects into account as a 
crucial component of a macroprudential approach to supervision (De Larosière 
Report, 2009), thus providing impetus to research for appropriate measures of 
systemic liquidity risk  as a first step to devise regulatory requirements. 
In this latter connection Severo (2012) estimated a systemic liquidity risk 
index (SLRI), building on violations of arbitrage relationships in various 
securities markets, whereby such violations are interpreted as indicators of 
liquidity stress in global financial markets. In fact, in normal liquidity conditions, 
arbitrageurs would take advantages through appropriate strategies from 
misalignments in prices (i.e. price bases). The SLRI received an implicit 
endorsement by IMF, being the main analytical tool presented and discussed in 
Chapter 2 of the April 2011 issue of the Global Financial Stability Review (IMF, 
2011). 
It has to be stressed, however, that other liquidity indexes have been 
constructed based on a similar methodology, namely a set of violations of 
arbitrage conditions yielding non-null bases and/or of market microstructure 
measures on turnover and bid-ask spreads to be summarized using different 
statistical tools, from simple averages of individual indicators to principal 
component analysis. An early example, immediately before the 2007 crisis, is 
Kerry (2008), whose composite indicator of market liquidity has been adopted in 
the April 2007 Bank of England Financial Stability Report (Bank of England 
2007). Kerry’s index of liquidity is computed by averaging nine measures, six of 
which are microstructural (three different bid-ask spreads representing the gilt 
repo market, the US dollar foreign exchange market and average of individual 
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stocks in the FTSE100); the remaining three are different return-to-volume 
measures for the gilt market, the stocks of the FTSE and S&P equity options
1
. 
The present paper builds on Severo’s SLRI for two main reasons. First, 
besides being to some extent validated by the IMF, the SLRI is instrumental in 
estimating, within a contingent claims analysis (CCA) pricing scheme, a 
Pigouvian tax that could be imposed by regulators to large banks for the 
externality arising from their individual exposure to a systemic liquidity risk. 
Second, from a macroprudential perspective, detecting a robust association 
between the SLRI and the evolution of large banks’ stock returns would be a 
promising, though only necessary condition, to pursue the agenda for a more 
resilient international banking system.  
The aim of this paper is to provide a more parsimonious variant of the 
SLRI with a reduced number of arbitrage violations, and to test its usefulness also 
over the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which could not be considered in 
Severo’s paper but for the initial developments in the Greek case. To this end the 
paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall the main issues connected 
with the estimate of the index, while in Section 3 we provide a parsimonious 
SLRI and illustrate a set of robustness checks on it. In Section 4 we investigate 
the statistical significance of this SLRI as a regressor explaining  level and 
variability of stock returns for a group of large international banks, over the two 
subsamples, 2004-2010 and 2010-2012, in the latter case in order to assess the 
potential of the SLRI as a regulatory tool against the backdrop of the sovereign 
risk crisis for the Eurozone. Final Section concludes. 
 
 
2. The estimation of the SLRI  
 
To estimate the SLRI Severo (2012) uses daily bases, namely price 
differentials with respect to zero arbitrage profit opportunities, across various 
                                                 
1
Kerry (2008) shows how a simple unweighted average yields an indicator very close to an 
alternative one using a principal component analysis approach. Two notable features are the 
normalization for each individual series over an assumed  “normal” period,  well before the crisis 
outburst (1999-2004),  and a decay factor of  0.94 discount in an exponentially weighted moving 
average of daily data, in order to privilege more recent information.  
 
 4 
 
geographic locations, and extracts, by means of principal component analysis 
(PCA),  statistical factors that drive most of the variation across these bases over 
time. The proposed index is represented by the first dominant underlying factor 
explaining most of the temporal evolution of these bases. Specifically,  four 
different types of arbitrage relationships are considered over the period  January 
2004 - October 2010 to find out possible bases: i) Covered Interest Parity (CIP); 
ii) CDS-Bond basis for non-bank corporations; iii) on-the-run versus off-the-run 
U.S. Treasuries; and iv) (interest rate) swap spread. The series for each basis and 
of the summarizing indicator are normalized, over the entire sample, at zero mean 
and unitary standard deviation. As plenty of liquidity allows to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities, negative and high (in absolute terms) values of the indicator point 
to systemic liquidity stresses. 
Overall the SLRI fluctuates mildly in periods of normal liquidity in global 
capital markets (i.e. between 2004 and 2007), signals some stresses around the 
Bear Stearns bail-out (March 2008) and drops sharply (more than 5 standard 
deviations below its mean) at mid-September 2008, after the Lehman bankruptcy. 
The pattern is roughly similar to the Bank of England Financial market liquidity 
index in the June 2009 issue of the Financial Stability Report (Bank of England 
2009). 
A few remarks are in order on the SLRI. First, Severo (2012) makes use of 
a very high number of arbitrage relationships (36), including a few which we 
checked were never violated in practice during the estimation period (swap 
spread) and others whose violation does not always correspond to the arbitrage 
rationale (e.g. on-the-run versus off-the-run U.S. Treasuries
2
). Second, the 
computation of CDS-bond bases implies a highly subjective selection of eleven 
unidentified non-bank American, European and Japanese corporations. Third, the 
indicator does not signal clearly a return to good liquidity conditions from early 
2009 and, given the sample period considered, it is not tested around the outburst 
of  the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (August 2011).  
Against this backdrop, the objective of the paper is twofold: 
                                                 
2
 The spread between the most recent issue (on.the-run) of Government bonds and the previous 
ones (off-the-run) is commonly interpreted as a liquidity indicator and can in principle be 
exploited for arbitrage strategies. However, Krishnamurthy (2002) shows that, considering the 
costs of shorting the on-the–run bonds, the arbitrage strategies are not profitable and Vayanos and 
Weill (2008) show that liquidity and specialness translate into price premia that are consistent with 
no-arbitrage. 
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i. to provide an estimation, over a period that includes also the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis, of a SLRI that is however derived from a more 
parsimonious set of elementary measures, and fully documented for 
data sources; 
ii. to test the validity of such a revised SLRI in the two time intervals which 
include different financial crises by econometrically investigating the 
strength of its association with large banks’ stock returns evolution, 
with particular reference to robustness issues (for which banks it turns 
out to be statistically significant) and to the implied empirical 
validation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) list of global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs). These institutions, because of 
the risk they impose for the resilience of the financial sector, in the 
Basel 3 framework should be charged with additional capital 
requirements (BCBS, 2013).    
 
3. A parsimonious estimate of the SLRI 
 
A well-known issue underlying the rapid transition from the financial to 
the economic international crisis in the semester following the Lehman 
bankruptcy is the dollar shortage for most European banks, heavily engaged in 
trade finance and in the international financial markets, and unable to tap the US 
interbank market because of the counterparty risk for potential lenders (McGuire 
and von Peter, 2009). On these grounds we contribute the literature proposing a 
parsimonious SLRI, fully documented for its elementary data sources, drawn from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Markit, and computed out of only two sets of 
arbitrage conditions that affect US and European headquartered operators. The 
first set refers to the CIP bases involving the U.S. dollar and 3 other currencies: 
the Euro, the British pound, the Swiss franc
3
, at the 3-, 6- and 12-months 
horizons. The CIP basis at day t for the $/€ is computed as: 
 
               CIPbasist,T = (1+i
$
t,T)(Ft,T/St) - (1+i
€
t,T)                                     (1) 
 
                                                 
3
 Differently from Severo (2012) we do not consider, for parsimony, the Japanese yen, the Hong 
Kong dollar, and the Singapore dollar, although we check for robustness when including the first 
currency (results available upon request). 
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     where F and S are the forward and spot exchange rates, T refers to the 3-, 6- 
and 12-months maturities, and is are the LIBOR rates at the corresponding 
maturities. The same holds for the other currencies vs. the US dollar. 
As for the CDS-Bond bases, arising from violations of the arbitrage 
relations equating CDS prices to credit spreads, we consider the relationship 
between the yields on 5-year corporate bonds and the 5-year CDS spreads for 8 
large, publicly traded non-bank corporations in the United States, United 
Kingdom and Eurozone
4
. Following the literature, we take the 5-year CDS 
contract, which represents the conventional maturity and hence is the most liquid 
one; in addition, the liquidity degree for the selected reference entities is enhanced 
by the inclusion in the iTraxx Europe CDS index for the European corporations 
and in CDX.NA.IG CDS index for the US ones. To compare 5 year CDS spreads 
and bond yield spreads, the first problem is how to find a corporate bond 
matching the 5 year constant maturity of the CDS contracts. The second issue 
concerns the risk free rate. The bond yield spreads can be calculated by 
subtracting the risk-free interest rate from the synthetic 5 year constant bonds 
yield. Government bond yields are not however an ideal proxy for risk-free rate, 
due to taxation treatment, repo specials and legal constraint. An alternative proxy 
for the risk-free rate is the interest rate swap, that has the advantage of being 
quoted on a constant maturity basis (Blanco et al., 2005). To create a synthetic 
constant 5 years maturity bond spread we follow Fontana (2010). For each day in 
the sample and for each reference entity we search for a bond with less than 5 
years left to maturity and another bond with more than 5 years to maturity; only 
senior, straight bonds are used. We extract the corporate bond spreads over the 
swap curve from Datastream using the datatype SWSP and by linearly 
interpolating them we approximate a 5 year to maturity bond spread. 
Though reducing the arbitrage conditions from 36 to 17, the estimated 
SLRI, with a first factor in the PCA procedure that accounts for over 60% of the 
variance
5
, is very close to Severo’s one during the same interval, dropping 
dramatically in the last quarter of 2008 and recovering only around mid-2009 
(Figures 1-2). 
                                                 
4
 Carrefour for France, Telecom for France, Deutsche Telekom for Germany, Vodafone Group for 
the UK, Cox Communication, IBM, Dominion Resources and Kinder Morgan Energy for the US. 
5
40% in Severo’s paper, as expected given the higher dimensionality of the arbitrage conditions.  
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[Figures 1-2 about here] 
 
3.1 Robustness checks   
We perform different robustness checks of our estimated SLRI:  
a. considering only CIP bases, in order to avoid the subjective choice of 
corporations for the Bond-CDS bases (Fig. 3). Having checked that the inclusion 
of yen did not change materially the results, we choose, for estimation parsimony, 
to stick to the SLRI index based on four currencies; 
 b. considering only three-months CIP bases, on the assumption that 
counterparty risks increase with a lengthened maturity. As expected, the 
variability of the index increased, but with no material changes in its pattern. We 
therefore decide, also for ease of comparison, to maintain the three maturities at 
three-, six- and twelve- months;  
c. substituting in the CIP bases calculations the US Dollar Libor rates with 
the Eurodollar  interest rates at the same maturities.  
It is worth discussing the last case, also in the light of the doubts cast on 
how US Libor rates are computed, being posted rates that do not reflect effective 
transactions
6
. In addition, as shown by the investigations on malpractices on Libor 
determination, some large banks in the respondents’ panel could have had the 
incentive to indicate lower interest rates, especially during the hottest months of 
the crisis from mid-September 2008 to the first half of 2009, to counteract doubts 
of their lenders on potential counterparty risks (Edmonds, 2013). An alternative 
benchmark for the average cost of raising offshore US dollar deposits is the 
Eurodollar rate downloadable  from the US Federal Reserve site under the 
heading H.15 Eurodollar deposit rate. During the peak period of the crisis, the 
spread of the Eurodollar rate to US dollar LIBOR at corresponding maturities 
increased sharply, suggesting that average US dollar borrowing costs across the 
broader range of banks did exceed LIBOR rates. In contrast, the average rate to 
borrow euros, measured using Euribor, tracked the euro LIBOR rate closely 
throughout the crisis. The evidence that US dollar LIBOR was below the actual 
                                                 
6
A Libor rate is computed as the interquartile trimmed mean of reported interbank offer (ask) rates 
provided each day by a panel of large banks in the London trading session. Each responding bank 
estimates the rate at which it could borrow unsecured on the interbank market at different 
maturities and for 10 currencies. 
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cost of borrowing US dollars in the market is consistent with the large measured 
bases in the foreign exchange swap market: the Eurodollar spreads to US dollar 
LIBOR correspond indeed closely with the premia paid to receive US dollars 
under swap (Ossolinski and Zurawski, 2010). 
The Eurodollar rate has however its own weaknesses: it is in fact an offered 
broker quote that reflects, by construction, the upper end of rates paid by banks, 
reported in the Federal Reserve’s H.15 report based on data from ICAP (Kuo et al., 
2012). In addition, comparing the Libor and the Eurodollar interest rate series the 
differences concentrate in a very narrow time interval (October 2008/June 2009) 
and the results for our estimated SLRI are negligible (results available upon 
request).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
All in all, the robustness checks do not show relevant differences across 
estimates of a SLRI with a reduced number of arbitrage conditions. Major 
differences emerge only when considering the January 2010 - early December 
2012 interval, because the estimated SLRI including only CIP bases signals much 
more sharply liquidity stresses tied to the euro crisis. Figure 3 shows that, had we 
left out the Bond-CDS bases, the resulting SLRI is much better to signal liquidity 
stresses in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis period, of a somewhat comparable 
order of magnitude with the 2008/09 period, a finding that is consistent with Allen 
and Moessner (2012) and Ivashina et al (2012). 
 
4. Banks’ stock returns and liquidity risk  
 
In this section, following Severo (2012), we investigate the impact of the 
SLRI on the stock returns of a group of large banks in Australia, Europe, India, 
Japan, Korea the United Kingdom, and the United States. The underlying 
hypothesis is that their high interconnectedness within the international financial 
markets should result in a significant link between their market valuations and 
global liquidity conditions. Our own contribution is to check for the robustness of 
the coefficient estimates for the SLRI as a regressor along four dimensions: 
1. parsimony of the SLRI estimation w.r.t. that presented in Severo (2012);  
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2. time dimension, by considering a lagged rather than contemporaneous 
(same day) effects of liquidity on stock returns (level and variability); 
3. relevance of the SLRI as an indicator of liquidity stress during the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis; 
4. empirical selection of systemically important banks, to the extent that their 
market valuations are significantly impacted by the SLRI. 
The rationale for the last criterion is that a poor statistical significance for 
the indicator has relevant implications for its proposed regulatory use. In fact, 
IMF (2011) and Severo (2012) suggest to use the index in order to estimate, in a 
contingent claims analysis (CCA) framework, liquidity premia to be charged, on 
macroprudential grounds, on large systemically important banks, because of the 
externalities on the global financial system that their exposition to systemic 
liquidity risk, proxied by the statistical association between their stock returns and 
the SLRI. The list of banks used in the econometric investigation includes 25 out 
of 28 gSIBs in the 2012 updated FSB (2012) classification. An interesting 
research question is whether and for which G-SIBs such an exposure to systemic 
liquidity risk is statistically significant and whether the same G-SIBs are singled 
out in the two time windows.   
Our starting point is to compare the estimation results for jointly modeling, 
in a maximum likelihood setting, level and daily variability in stock returns for a 
group of 51 (53 in Severo) large international banks, including among the 
regressors, besides the SLRI, an expanded set of controls for market returns, 
idiosyncratic and sector credit risk and market uncertainty
 7.
 
The econometric specification to model the impact of the SLRI on the 
level and the volatility of bank i’s stock returns assumes an ARCH(1) process 
whereby the conditional volatility is directly affected by the SLRI: 
 
Rt
i
 =  β0
i
 + β1
i
 Rt
M
 + β2
i
 SLRIt + βX
i
 Xt + et
i
 σt
i
                              (2) 
 
(σt
i
)
2 
= exp(ω0
i
 + ω1
i
 SLRIt + ωY
i
 Yt)+ γ
i
(et-1
i
)
2
; et
i  N(0,1)          (3) 
 
                                                 
7
 Some tables report results for less than 51 banks when the statistical algorithm, implemented in 
MATLAB, fails to converge.  
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where R
i
 is the log daily difference of the i-th bank dollar-denominated stock price 
and R
M 
is the return on the market portfolio, proxied by the return on the dollar-
denominated MSCI world index covering 24 developed countries. The vectors X 
and Y represent controls included in the model – individual and group average 
CDS and the volatility index VIX
8
 - in order to try to purge the effects of systemic 
liquidity stresses on stock returns from idiosyncratic and sector credit risk factors 
and stock market uncertainty. For ease of comparison we follow Severo (2012) in 
the choice of the exponential functional form for the conditional 
heteroskedasticity, in order to avoid negative fitted values for the volatility 
process. We expect , , because more liquidity should sustain return 
levels whereas lower liquidity, being a proxy for market uncertainty, would raise 
return volatility.   
We report and comment the econometric findings for the time intervals, 
2004-2010 and  2010-2012; the overlap in 2010 allows a comparison with the 
econometric results in Severo (2012) when using different SLRIs. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.1 Systemic liquidity stress and the 2007/08 crisis 
From inspection of Table 1, reporting the estimates of the baseline 
specification without controls, a first striking result is that, in spite of the very 
close approximation between Severo’s and our own estimated SLRI, different 
banks are singled out when considering the ones with at least a 90% p-value for 
the SLRI in both equations: three (among which only one G-SIB) instead of seven 
(with three other G-SIBs).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports results when considering for robustness a one day lagged 
SLRI, simply to take into account that investors may not be able to gather in real 
time information on global markets to act upon: even such a slight modification 
                                                 
8
 The SBOE SPX Volatility VIX index, produced by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
estimates the implicit volatility of a synthetic option on the S&P 500 dollar-denominated index 
over the next 30-day period. It represents one widely adopted measure of expectations of stock 
market volatility. 
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yields among the four banks selected only one overlap (Bank of America) with 
Table 1. It is worth mentioning that this difference emerges although the 
correlation of contemporaneous and lagged SLRI with other variables are almost 
identical. We interpret these findings as a hint of the lack of robustness of the 
SLRI for regulatory use.  
Table 3 highlights a second main result, again witnessing that non robust 
effects of the SLRI  are obtained when controlling for individual CDS, in order to 
take into account idiosyncratic credit risk: for only three banks instead of four the 
regressor is statistically significant on stock returns (level and variability); what’s 
more interesting, only three G-SIBs are singled out (Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs 
and Wells Fargo).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
A third relevant result is that, controlling for bank sector average CDS and 
the VIX as a classical indicator of market uncertainty, the SLRI does not turn 
significant in the variance equation in 15 (among which Wells Fargo) out of 51 
banks, compared to 10 out of 53 in Severo (Table 4). The outcome is not 
surprising because liquidity stresses are bound to increase market uncertainty, as 
shown by the negative correlation between SLRI and log VIX (- 0,90 over the 
sample 2004-2010 and - 0,66 over the 2010-2012 period). 
Finally, in Table 5 we report results when all controls are included, namely 
both individual and bank group average CDS (to consider idiosyncratic and 
banking sector credit risk), and the VIX as well.  The SLRI becomes insignificant 
in the variance equation for almost three fifths of banks whereas it is highly 
significant in only 11 G-SIBs. 
 
[Tables 4-5 about here] 
 
4.1 The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis  
 
The pattern of econometric findings for the 2010-2012 period is similar to 
the one for the previous crisis, though with some interesting differences when 
considering Eurozone headquartered banks. First, the SLRI is highly significant 
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almost always in the variance equation and hardly so for the level of stock returns. 
Experimenting with a one-day lagged SLRI yields again that the regressor is more 
often significant, at least at the 10 per cent confidence, and that there is  lack of 
robustness in identifying specific banks when allowing for an even small timing 
variation (Tables 6-7).  
 
[Tables 6-7 about here] 
 
An interesting feature that emerges when inserting all controls – individual 
CDS and  average CDS and VIX, all in logs - is that within the small group of 
banks where the SLRI is statistically significant, there is a neat split between 
Eurozone banks that are headquartered in sovereign-risk hit countries (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain) or have received a public capital infusion (Commerzbank, in 
2008, only partially refunded in 2012) and four other ones, among which three 
US, G-SIBs. Whereas for the latter group the negative sign in the variance 
equation is intuitively explained because a larger SLRI, meaning a lack of 
liquidity, increases uncertainty and therefore the volatility in stock returns, the 
opposite sign for the former group is prima facie rather puzzling. Our suggested 
interpretation is that for these banks, mostly depending on public support for their 
viability, a lack of liquidity could strengthen the belief, on grounds of moral 
hazard considerations, of a further infusion of public resources, inducing to bet for 
a less bumpy stock returns evolution (Table 8)
9
. 
 
 [Table 8 about here] 
 
 
It is worth to stress a technical detail that however further highlights the 
lack of robustness of possible regulatory policy uses of the SLRI. We checked 
that simply changing from logs to levels of individual CDS spreads alters the 
sample of banks where the convergence in the statistical algorithm is attained and 
the banks associated to a statistical significant SLRI coefficient, though the 
different sign among Eurozone and US based G-SIBs remains.  
                                                 
9
 The results on the split between euro-based banks and US ones are qualitatively robust when 
inserting lagged instead of contemporaneous SLRI.  
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5. Conclusions 
We provide estimates of a SLRI comparable to the one proposed in IMF 
(2011) and Severo (2012) but derived from a more parsimonious, and fully 
documented, set of elementary measures of market liquidity stress, extending the 
period to 2012, in order to include also the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We 
then perform an econometric investigation of the association between the SLRI 
and a group of large banks’ stock prices, with particular reference to robustness 
issues (i.e. for which banks the indicator turns out to be statistically significant) 
and to an empirical validation of the systemically important banks (G-SIBs) list 
proposed by the Financial Stability Board. We assess the issues across the 
subprime financial crisis and its developments up to 2010 in the first time interval, 
and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in the second one.   
In connection with our parsimonious SLRI estimation, main findings are 
that the indicator is close to Severo’s but provides a stronger signal of liquidity 
stress and recovery episodes over the same period. Moreover robustness checks 
do not show relevant differences across estimates built on a reduced number of 
arbitrage conditions, except when considering the 2010-2012 interval. In fact, a 
SLRI including only CIP bases signals more sharply liquidity stresses in the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis period, comparable with the 2008/09 period, a 
finding that is consistent with Allen and Moessner (2012) and Ivashina et al. 
(2012). 
As for the econometric investigation on banks’ exposure to liquidity risk, 
results for the baseline specification with no controls are prima facie consistent 
with Severo (2012) and show that the effect of liquidity on stock returns is in 
practice absent, whereas it is positive on their volatility. However, different banks 
are singled out when considering the ones with significant p-values for the SLRI 
in both equations: three (among which only one G-SIB) instead of seven (with 
three other G-SIBs) in Severo (2012). When introducing controls for idiosyncratic 
and group credit risk and stock market uncertainty, the statistical significance of 
the SLRI is reduced and varies across banks. These results motivate a sceptical 
assessment of the IMF suggestion), to use a SLRI as an input to compute a 
Pigouvian tax to charge on highly interconnected banks for the externality on the 
international banking system out of their risk exposure to a global liquidity risk.  
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The pattern of  findings during the Eurozone sovereign  debt crisis is 
similar, but for the interesting result of a neat split between two groups of banks: 
the Eurozone banks that are headquartered in sovereign-risk hit countries or have 
received a public capital infusion, on the one hand, and four other, among which 
three US, G-SIBs, on the other hand. Results highlight that, contrary to 
expectations, liquidity stresses are associated with a reduced volatility of stock 
returns in the first group, possibly on ground of moral hazard.  
We envisage two main themes for research. The ambiguous implications 
of our results on the issue of systemic liquidity risk and stock performance of 
differently headquartered G-SIBs, and hence of their resilience against such a risk, 
call for a deeper investigation of their (expected) dependence on domestic and 
foreign central banks as providers of their home and foreign liquidity. The very 
same elementary measures of market liquidity stresses can be different across 
financial crises and/or financial markets, because of the effective transaction costs 
and of the markets’ convention on how a price basis falls outside a normal range 
and therefore signals a liquidity stress. An empirical investigation on non linear 
effects of a SLRI could help to shed some light on these issues, which are left for 
future research work.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Parsimonious and Severo’s SLRI. 
01/01/2004 – 31/10/2010 (1804 obs); on the y-axis: standard deviations 
 
Sources: (red) own estimates and (green) Severo (2012). 
 
Figure 2.  Full sample parsimonious SLRI 
01/01/2004 – 05/12/2012 (2330 obs) 
 
Source: own estimates; full sample (blue), reduced sample (red) 
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Figure 3. Parsimonious SLRI excluding CDS-Bond bases 
01/01/2004 – 05/12/2012 (2330 obs) 
 
                                    Source: own estimates. 
 
 
 19 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1. Baseline specification (01/01/2004 – 31/10/2010; 1804 obs) 
Bank      β1
i
             β2
i
             ω1
i
 
National Australia Bank 0.923 *** -0.077 -0.744 *** 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.976 *** -0.066 -0.681 *** 
Erste Group Bank 1.669 *** 0.030 -0.884 *** 
Dexia 1.454 *** 0.184 ** -1.216 *** 
KBC Group 1.505 *** 0.038 -1.354 *** 
BNP Paribas 1.658 *** 0.021 -0.963 *** 
Société Générale 1.764 *** 0.064 -0.905 *** 
Crédit Agricole 1.720 *** 0.097 -0.795 *** 
Deutsche Bank 1.694 *** -0.029 -0.897 *** 
Commerzbank 1.739 *** 0.091 -0.897 *** 
National Bank of Greece 1.477 *** 0.040 -0.622 *** 
Alpha Bank 1.292 *** 0.090 -0.546 *** 
Bank of Piraeus 1.326 *** 0.124 -0.572 *** 
Unicredit 1.532 *** 0.047 -0.923 *** 
Intesa Sanpaolo 1.401 *** 0.084 -0.692 *** 
Banco Commmercial Portugues 1.047 *** 0.105 * -0.452 *** 
Banco Espirito Santo 0.893 *** 0.064 -0.878 *** 
Banco Santander 1.539 *** -0.004 -0.736 *** 
BBV Argentaria 1.524 *** 0.034 -0.756 *** 
Banco Popular Español 1.349 *** 0.069 -0.764 *** 
UBS 1.529 *** 0.023 -1.008 *** 
Credit Suisse Group 1.521 *** 0.018 -0.789 *** 
Nordea Bank 1.560 *** 0.017 -0.841 *** 
Svenska Handbkn 1.376 *** -0.040 -0.821 *** 
Swedbank 1.668 *** -0.003 -0.997 *** 
DNB Nor 1.414 *** 0.028 -0.944 *** 
Danske Bank 1.240 *** -0.020 -0.814 *** 
State Bank Of India 0.822 *** 0.020 -0.297 *** 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.578 *** 0.128 -0.548 *** 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 0.541 *** 0.076 -0.606 *** 
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group 0.578 *** 0.015 -0.451 *** 
Shinhan Financial Group 0.880 *** 0.042 -0.605 *** 
Australia & New Zealand Bank 0.950 *** -0.108 -0.777 *** 
HSBC Holding  1.061 *** 0.014 -1.064 *** 
Barclays 1.527 *** 0.049 -1.391 *** 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1.436 *** 0.107 -1.640 *** 
Lloyds Banking Group 1.352 *** 0.075 -1.533 *** 
Standard Chartered 1.579 *** -0.026 -0.842 *** 
Bank of America 1.075 *** 0.205 ** -1.831 *** 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1.239 *** 0.046 -1.328 *** 
Citigroup 1.364 *** -0.147 -1.611 *** 
Wells Fargo & Co 1.100 *** -0.135 -1.567 *** 
Morgan Stanley. 1.565 *** 0.061 -1.160 *** 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.358 *** -0.054 -0.853 *** 
US Bancorp 1.012 *** -0.057 -1.388 *** 
PNC Financial Services Group 1.032 *** 0.069 -1.448 *** 
SunTrust Banks 1.162 *** -0.068 -1.611 *** 
BB&T 0.992 *** 0.025 -1.262 *** 
Regions Bank 1.184 *** 0.096 -1.510 *** 
Bank of  New York Mellon 1.231 *** 0.009 -0.995 *** 
State Street 1.357 *** -0.142 -1.553 *** 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values. In Tables (2-5) 2010 short for 31/10/2010. 
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Table 2.  Baseline specification with one-day lagged SLRI (02/01/2004 – 31/10/2010; 
1803 obs) 
Bank      β1
i
             β2
i
             ω1
i
 
National Australia Bank 0.926 *** -0.075 -0.743 *** 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.987 *** -0.095 -0.693 *** 
Erste Group Bank 1.675 *** 0.035 -0.874 *** 
Dexia 1.469 *** 0.142 -1.237 *** 
KBC Group 1.521 *** 0.000 -1.333 *** 
BNP Paribas 1.655 *** 0.008 -0.980 *** 
Société Générale 1.777 *** 0.022 -0.910 *** 
Crédit Agricole 1.725 *** 0.101 -0.785 *** 
Deutsche Bank 1.706 *** -0.009 -0.902 *** 
Commerzbank 1.741 *** 0.106 -0.903 *** 
National Bank of Greece 1.470 *** 0.034 -0.620 *** 
Alpha Bank 1.277 *** 0.064 -0.548 *** 
Bank of Piraeus 1.312 *** 0.101 -0.575 *** 
Unicredit 1.531 *** 0.047 -0.924 *** 
Intesa Sanpaolo 1.393 *** 0.054 -0.703 *** 
Banco Commmercial Portugues 1.032 *** 0.102 -0.456 *** 
Banco Espirito Santo 0.881 *** 0.035 -0.893 *** 
Banco Santander 1.532 *** -0.022 -0.761 *** 
BBV Argentaria 1.515 *** 0.030 -0.776 *** 
Banco Popular Español 1.341 *** 0.062 -0.771 *** 
UBS 1.522 *** 0.087 -1.027 *** 
Credit Suisse Group 1.527 *** 0.022 -0.768 *** 
Nordea Bank 1.557 *** 0.013 -0.843 *** 
Svenska Handbkn 1.386 *** -0.037 -0.824 *** 
Swedbank 1.670 *** -0.023 -0.999 *** 
DNB Nor 1.419 *** -0.020 -0.937 *** 
Danske Bank 1.249 *** -0.016 -0.815 *** 
State Bank Of India 0.824 *** 0.033 -0.292 *** 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.588 *** 0.145 -0.563 *** 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 0.553 *** 0.097 -0.615 *** 
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group 0.586 *** 0.023 -0.454 *** 
Shinhan Financial Group 0.869 *** 0.063 -0.614 *** 
Australia & New Zealand Bank 0.967 *** -0.081 -0.782 *** 
HSBC Holding  1.053 *** 0.051 -1.059 *** 
Barclays 1.537 *** 0.013 -1.367 *** 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1.488 *** 0.005 -1.633 *** 
Lloyds Banking Group 1.399 *** 0.001 -1.524 *** 
Standard Chartered 1.584 *** -0.025 -0.829 *** 
Bank of America 1.036 *** 0.189 ** -1.852 *** 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1.196 *** 0.050 -1.278 *** 
Citigroup 1.321 *** 0.006 -1.670 *** 
Wells Fargo & Co 1.084 *** -0.241 *** -1.591 *** 
Morgan Stanley 1.542 *** 0.109 -1.144 *** 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.364 *** -0.006 -0.831 *** 
US Bancorp 1.032 *** -0.025 -1.335 *** 
PNC Financial Services Group 1.023 *** 0.139 -1.360 *** 
SunTrust Banks 1.189 *** -0.088 -1.592 *** 
BB&T 0.957 *** 0.059 -1.278 *** 
Regions Bank 1.019 *** 0.432 *** -1.549 *** 
Bank of  New York Mellon 1.213 *** 0.102 -0.999 *** 
State Street 1.358 *** -0.109 -1.551 *** 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values. β2
i
  and  ω1
i
 refer to SLRIt-1. 
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Table 3. Baseline specification augmented for individual CDS (2004 – 2010) 
Bank    β1
i
        β2
i
    βCDS
i
        ω1
i
       ωCDS
i
 obs 
National Australia Bank 0.896 *** -0.253 ** -0.0035 ** -0.265 *** 0.014 *** 1804 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.936 *** -0.085  -0.0012  -0.269 *** 0.013 *** 1804 
Erste Group Bank 1.589 *** 0.217 * 0.0014  -0.548 *** 0.005 *** 1804 
Dexia 1.357 *** 0.087  -0.0006  -0.517 *** 0.007 *** 1804 
KBC Group 1.444 *** 0.206  0.0012  -0.399 *** 0.012 *** 1804 
BNP Paribas 1.599 *** 0.060  0.0008  -0.730 *** 0.011 *** 1804 
Crédit Agricole 1.613 *** 0.067  0.0001  -0.544 *** 0.011 *** 1804 
Deutsche Bank 1.671 *** -0.097  -0.0013  -0.545 *** 0.010 *** 1804 
Commerzbank 1.748 *** 0.079  -0.0008  -0.683 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Unicredit 1.397 *** -0.003  -0.0010  -0.569 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Intesa Sanpaolo 1.291 *** 0.024  -0.0010  -0.457 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Banco Santander 1.445 *** -0.035  -0.0005  -0.386 *** 0.011 *** 1804 
BBV Argentaria 1.438 *** -0.014  -0.0007  -0.483 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Banco Popular Español 1.206 *** 0.079  -0.0003  -0.307 *** 0.006 *** 1804 
UBS 1.397 *** 0.090  -0.0002  -0.218 *** 0.014 *** 1804 
Credit Suisse Group 1.496 *** -0.076  -0.0014  -0.474 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Nordea Bank 1.480 *** 0.033  0.0002  -0.305 *** 0.015 *** 1804 
Svenska Handbkn 1.343 *** -0.021  0.0001  -0.345 *** 0.015 *** 1804 
Swedbank 1.610 *** 0.223 ** 0.0022 * -0.429 *** 0.007 *** 1804 
DNB Nor 1.844 *** 0.119  0.0038  -0.405 *** 0.018 *** 718 
Danske Bank 1.189 *** 0.116  0.0016  -0.261 *** 0.013 *** 1804 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.588 *** 0.092  -0.0008  -0.401 *** 0.006 *** 1804 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 0.568 *** 0.111  0.0010  -0.385 *** 0.009 *** 1761 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 0.587 *** 0.046  0.0008  -0.300 *** 0.006 *** 1761 
Australia &New Zealand Banking 0.927 *** -0.183 * -0.0021  -0.384 *** 0.012 *** 1804 
HSBC Holding  0.982 *** 0.145 ** 0.0022 ** -0.485 *** 0.017 *** 1804 
Barclays 1.464 *** 0.151  0.0003  -0.452 *** 0.016 *** 1804 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1.331 *** 0.096  -0.0003  -1.219 *** 0.010 *** 1804 
Lloyds Banking Group 1.275 *** 0.211  0.0010  -1.005 *** 0.012 *** 1804 
Standard Chartered 1.674 *** 0.066  0.0011  -0.553 *** 0.005 *** 1447 
Bank of America 0.953 *** 0.291 *** 0.0009  -0.582 *** 0.018 *** 1804 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1.196 *** 0.079  0.0007  -0.323 *** 0.023 *** 1804 
Citigroup 1.210 *** 0.104  -0.0003  -0.620 *** 0.009 *** 1804 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.898 *** 0.260 ** 0.0027 * -0.296 *** 0.024 *** 1804 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.338 *** -0.231 * -0.0021 * -0.106  0.009 *** 1804 
PNC Financial Services Group 1.388 *** 0.301  -0.0021  -0.820 *** 0.004 *** 718 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values.  
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Table 4. Variance equation  augmented for average CDS and VIX (2004 – 2010) 
Bank             ω1
i
       ωlogAVCDS
i
      ωlogVIX
i
 
National Australia Bank -0.102 * 0.181 *** 1.641 *** 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.025 0.081 2.019 *** 
Erste Group Bank -0.156 ** -0.041 1.941 *** 
Dexia -0.288 *** 0.437 *** 1.744 *** 
KBC Group -0.218 *** 0.362 *** 1.940 *** 
BNP Paribas -0.244 *** 0.001 1.935 *** 
Société Générale -0.110 * 0.198 *** 1.897 *** 
Crédit Agricole -0.267 *** 0.378 *** 0.764 *** 
Deutsche Bank -0.162 *** 0.133 ** 1.724 *** 
Commerzbank -0.324 *** 0.024 1.493 *** 
National Bank of Greece -0.102 * 0.541 *** 0.462 ** 
Alpha Bank -0.105 0.780 *** -0.235 
Bank of Piraeus -0.083 0.725 *** 0.082 
Unicredit -0.328 *** 0.217 *** 1.220 *** 
Intesa Sanpaolo -0.218 *** 0.090 1.074 *** 
Banco Commmercial Portugues 0.172 *** 0.118 * 1.603 *** 
Banco Espirito Santo -0.222 *** 0.740 *** 0.306 
Banco Santander 0.042 0.259 *** 1.635 *** 
BBV Argentaria -0.117 * 0.318 *** 1.148 *** 
Banco Popular Español -0.010 0.666 *** 0.881 *** 
UBS -0.181 *** 0.391 *** 1.496 *** 
Credit Suisse Group -0.251 *** 0.051 1.503 *** 
Nordea Bank -0.219 *** -0.078 1.781 *** 
Svenska Handbkn -0.276 *** -0.151 ** 1.682 *** 
Swedbank -0.230 *** 0.123 * 1.631 *** 
DNB Nor -0.235 *** -0.127 * 2.005 *** 
Danske Bank -0.147 ** 0.292 *** 1.250 *** 
State Bank Of India 0.065 -0.302 *** 1.653 *** 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.109 * -0.127 * 2.265 *** 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group -0.096 -0.168 ** 1.789 *** 
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group 0.060 -0.320 *** 2.121 *** 
Shinhan Financial Group -0.080 -0.348 *** 2.139 *** 
Australia & New Zealand Bank -0.075 0.053 1.956 *** 
HSBC Holding  -0.058 0.346 ** 2.001 *** 
Barclays -0.164 ** 0.084 2.758 *** 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group -0.358 *** 0.444 *** 2.207 *** 
Lloyds Banking Group -0.425 *** 0.586 *** 1.471 *** 
Standard Chartered -0.292 *** -0.020 1.537 *** 
Bank of America -0.339 *** 0.771 *** 1.915 *** 
JP Morgan Chase & Co -0.231 *** 0.243 *** 2.282 *** 
Citigroup -0.423 *** 0.660 *** 1.751 *** 
Wells Fargo & Co -0.081 0.509 *** 2.627 *** 
Morgan Stanley -0.340 *** 0.077 2.052 *** 
Goldman Sachs Group -0.245 *** 0.194 *** 1.253 *** 
US Bancorp -0.009 0.463 *** 2.291 *** 
PNC Financial Services Group -0.118 0.295 *** 2.472 *** 
SunTrust Banks -0.139 ** 0.681 *** 2.104 *** 
BB&T -0.038 0.540 *** 2.054 *** 
Regions Bank -0.210 *** 0.589 *** 2.203 *** 
Bank of  New York Mellon -0.463 *** 0.106 1.309 *** 
State Street -0.465 *** -0.085 2.481 *** 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values.  
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Table 5 Variance equation  augmented for individual CDS and logs of average CDS and VIX 
(2004 – 2010) 
Bank       ω1
i
          ωCDS
i
     ωlogAVCDS
i
      ωlogVIX
i
 obs 
National Australia Bank -0.049 
 
0.006 ** -0.009 
 
1.590 *** 1804 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.044 
 
0.003 -0.051 
 
2.003 *** 1804 
Erste Group Bank -0.097 
 
0.003 *** -0.258 *** 1.938 *** 1804 
Dexia -0.088 
 
0.005 *** -0.059 
 
2.000 *** 1804 
KBC Group -0.094 
 
0.009 *** -0.056 
 
1.469 *** 1804 
BNP Paribas -0.260 *** 0.004 -0.152 
 
1.962 *** 1804 
Société Générale -0.133 ** 0.009 ** -0.205 
 
1.935 *** 1804 
Crédit Agricole -0.279 *** 0.003 0.217 
 
0.834 *** 1804 
Deutsche Bank -0.239 *** -0.012 ** 0.600 *** 1.752 *** 1804 
Commerzbank -0.346 *** 0.004 -0.121 
 
1.462 *** 1804 
Unicredit -0.329 *** 0.007 *** -0.137 
 
1.166 *** 1804 
Intesa Sanpaolo -0.244 *** 0.011 *** -0.330 *** 1.057 *** 1804 
Banco Santander 0.040 
 
0.012 *** -0.471 *** 2.030 *** 1804 
BBV Argentaria -0.146 ** 0.008 *** -0.287 ** 1.505 *** 1804 
Banco Popular Español 0.070 
 
0.002 *** 0.339 *** 1.224 *** 1804 
UBS 0.007 
 
0.011 *** -0.081 
 
1.270 *** 1804 
Credit Suisse Group -0.239 *** 0.004 ** -0.083 
 
1.330 *** 1804 
Nordea Bank 0.047 
 
0.019 *** -0.579 *** 1.805 *** 1804 
Svenska Handbkn -0.010 
 
0.021 *** -0.599 *** 1.563 *** 1804 
Swedbank -0.026 
 
0.006 *** -0.160 ** 1.694 *** 1804 
DNB Nor 0.164 
 
0.019 *** -1.415 *** 2.720 *** 718 
Danske Bank -0.070 
 
0.004 ** 0.159 * 1.213 *** 1804 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.103 
 
-0.001 -0.104 
 
2.258 *** 1804 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group -0.082 
 
0.002 -0.162 
 
1.655 *** 1761 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 0.072 
 
0.002 -0.328 *** 2.047 *** 1761 
Australia&NewZeland Banking -0.046 
 
0.004 -0.093 
 
1.951 *** 1804 
HSBC Holding  0.082 
 
0.010 *** -0.038 
 
2.222 *** 1804 
Barclays 0.067 
 
0.015 *** -0.560 *** 2.538 *** 1804 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group -0.434 *** -0.008 *** 0.997 *** 1.913 *** 1804 
Lloyds Banking Group -0.421 *** 0.001 0.519 *** 1.513 *** 1804 
Standard Chartered -0.210 *** 0.002 -0.162 ** 1.649 *** 1447 
Bank of America -0.204 *** 0.011 *** 0.136 
 
1.800 *** 1804 
JP Morgan Chase & Co, -0.028 
 
0.022 *** -0.369 *** 1.708 *** 1804 
Citigroup -0.284 *** 0.004 *** 0.358 *** 1.601 *** 1804 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.107 * 0.017 *** -0.127 
 
2.121 *** 1804 
Goldman Sachs Group -0.003 
 
0.006 *** -0.026 
 
1.040 *** 1804 
PNC Financial Services Group 0.110 
 
0.003 *** -0.210 
 
3.183 *** 718 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values.  
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Table 6. Baseline specification (01/01/2010 – 05/12/2012: obs 764) 
Bank      β1
i
             β2
i
             ω1
i
 
National Australia Bank 0.954 *** 0.047  -0.862 *** 
Erste Group Bank 2.051 *** 0.495 *** -1.199 *** 
Dexia 2.087 *** -0.038  -0.750 *** 
KBC Group 2.409 *** 0.388  -0.911 *** 
BNP Paribas 2.340 *** 0.303 * -1.327 *** 
Société Générale 2.636 *** 0.375 * -1.078 *** 
Crédit Agricole 2.492 *** 0.357 * -0.765 *** 
Deutsche Bank 2.136 *** 0.300 ** -0.846 *** 
Commerzbank 2.129 *** 0.146  -0.605 *** 
National Bank of Greece 1.805 *** 0.280  -0.342 ** 
Alpha Bank 1.810 *** 0.529  -0.404 *** 
Bank of Piraeus 1.512 *** 0.191  -0.122  
Unicredit 2.409 *** 0.356  -0.898 *** 
Intesa Sanpaolo 2.506 *** 0.115  -0.665 *** 
Banco Commmercial Portugues 1.507 *** 0.576 *** -0.460 *** 
Banco Espirito Santo 1.682 *** 0.404 * -0.971 *** 
Banco Santander 2.043 *** 0.100  -0.580 *** 
BBV Argentaria 2.123 *** 0.097  -0.529 *** 
Banco Popular Español 1.711 *** -0.098  0.107  
UBS 1.599 *** 0.327 ** -0.625 *** 
Credit Suisse Group 1.653 *** 0.279 * -0.843 *** 
Nordea Bank 1.815 *** -0.080  -0.596 *** 
Svenska Handbkn 1.524 *** -0.087  -0.536 *** 
Swedbank 1.889 *** 0.021  -0.683 *** 
DNB Nor 1.777 *** 0.143  -0.555 *** 
Danske Bank 1.550 *** 0.017  -0.528 *** 
State Bank Of India 0.677 *** 0.044  -0.312 ** 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.288 *** -0.065  0.238 * 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 0.327 *** -0.027  0.018  
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group 0.351 *** -0.003  -0.113  
Shinhan Financial Group 0.704 *** 0.026  -0.878 *** 
Australia & New Zealand Bank 1.038 *** -0.092  -0.866 *** 
HSBC Holding  1.224 *** 0.090  -0.624 *** 
Barclays 2.213 *** 0.168  -0.917 *** 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1.958 *** 0.231  -0.971 *** 
Lloyds Banking Group 1.948 *** 0.203  -0.624 *** 
Standard Chartered 1.433 *** 0.000  -0.637 *** 
Bank of America 1.493 *** -0.100  -1.241 *** 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1.312 *** -0.031  -1.080 *** 
Citigroup 1.666 *** 0.034  -0.779 *** 
Wells Fargo & Co 1.292 *** -0.170  -0.456 *** 
Morgan Stanley 1.514 *** 0.055  -1.340 *** 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.107 *** 0.076  -0.740 *** 
US Bancorp 1.069 *** -0.150  -0.871 *** 
PNC Financial Services Group 1.153 *** -0.166  -0.522 *** 
SunTrust Banks 1.590 *** -0.072  -0.775 *** 
BB&T 1.127 *** -0.230 * -0.465 *** 
Regions Bank 1.732 *** -0.158  -0.668 *** 
Bank of  New York Mellon 1.239 *** -0.009  -0.573 *** 
State Street 1.223 *** 0.087  -0.761 *** 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values.  
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Table 7. Baseline specification with lagged SLRI (2010 – 2012; obs. 763) 
Bank      β1
i
             β2
i
             ω1
i
 
National Australia Bank 0.952 *** 0.051 -0.871 *** 
Erste Group Bank 2.050 *** 0.503 *** -1.161 *** 
Dexia 2.093 *** -0.026 -0.802 *** 
KBC Group 2.395 *** 0.418 * -0.910 *** 
BNP Paribas 2.298 *** 0.389 ** -1.311 *** 
Société Générale 2.627 *** 0.425 ** -1.131 *** 
Crédit Agricole 2.478 *** 0.408 ** -0.776 *** 
Deutsche Bank 2.137 *** 0.319 ** -0.862 *** 
Commerzbank 2.135 *** 0.151 -0.638 *** 
National Bank of Greece 1.809 *** 0.260 -0.421 *** 
Alpha Bank 1.820 *** 0.590 -0.456 *** 
Bank of Piraeus 1.544 *** 0.120 -0.242 
Unicredit 2.403 *** 0.410 * -0.910 *** 
Intesa Sanpaolo 2.504 *** 0.136 -0.714 *** 
Banco Commmercial Portugues 1.510 *** 0.541 *** -0.525 *** 
Banco Espirito Santo 1.666 *** 0.358 -0.988 *** 
Banco Santander 2.029 *** 0.116 -0.616 *** 
BBV Argentaria 2.108 *** 0.110 -0.557 *** 
Banco Popular Español 1.713 *** -0.084 0.051 
UBS 1.594 *** 0.332 ** -0.639 *** 
Credit Suisse Group 1.638 *** 0.329 ** -0.849 *** 
Nordea Bank 1.805 *** -0.063 -0.605 *** 
Svenska Handbkn 1.517 *** -0.088 -0.575 *** 
Swedbank 1.880 *** 0.017 -0.711 *** 
DNB Nor 1.773 *** 0.142 -0.620 *** 
Danske Bank 1.538 *** -0.049 -0.519 *** 
State Bank Of India 0.676 *** 0.072 -0.271 ** 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.290 *** -0.082 0.162 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 0.328 *** -0.055 -0.033 
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group 0.353 *** -0.013 -0.174 
Shinhan Financial Group 0.701 *** 0.035 -0.873 *** 
Australia & New Zealand Bank 1.035 *** -0.075 -0.878 *** 
HSBC Holding  1.221 *** 0.090 -0.639 *** 
Barclays 2.198 *** 0.217 -0.918 *** 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1.932 *** 0.263 -0.985 *** 
Lloyds Banking Group 1.938 *** 0.208 -0.537 *** 
Standard Chartered 1.424 *** -0.007 -0.697 *** 
Bank of America 1.495 *** -0.100 -1.231 *** 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1.318 *** -0.021 -1.052 *** 
Citigroup 1.683 *** 0.041 -0.732 *** 
Wells Fargo & Co 1.292 *** -0.160 -0.408 *** 
Morgan Stanley 1.528 *** 0.081 -1.323 *** 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.110 *** 0.094 -0.745 *** 
US Bancorp 1.072 *** -0.146 -0.772 *** 
PNC Financial Services Group 1.153 *** -0.181 -0.498 *** 
SunTrust Banks 1.604 *** -0.071 -0.690 *** 
BB&T 1.133 *** -0.233 * -0.369 *** 
Regions Bank 1.738 *** -0.164 -0.610 *** 
Bank of  New York Mellon 1.243 *** -0.005 -0.548 *** 
State Street 1.228 *** 0.093 -0.751 *** 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values. β2
i
 and ω1
i
 refer to SLRIt-1. 
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Table 8. Variance equation  augmented for logs of individual and average CDS and VIX (2010 
– 2012) 
Bank       ω1
i
          ωlogCDS
i
     ωlogAVCDS
i
      ωlogVIX
i
 obs 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 0.245 
 
-0.054 -0.472 
 
2.644 *** 764 
Erste Group Bank -0.018 
 
1.872 *** -0.500 
 
1.001 *** 764 
Dexia 0.294 
 
2.762 *** -1.067 * 1.153 *** 764 
KBC Group 0.024 
 
1.270 ** 0.042 
 
1.201 *** 764 
BNP Paribas 0.261 
 
0.119 1.058 
 
2.433 *** 764 
Société Générale -0.088 
 
0.794 0.021 
 
1.177 *** 764 
Crédit Agricole 0.290 
 
0.067 1.081 ** 1.331 *** 764 
Deutsche Bank 0.087 
 
-0.332 1.067 *** 1.293 *** 764 
Commerzbank 0.523 ** -0.983 ** 2.637 *** 0.783 ** 764 
National Bank of Greece 0.348 * 0.935 * 0.122 
 
0.976 *** 764 
Alpha Bank 0.041 
 
0.074 1.410 
 
-0.185 
 
764 
Bank of Piraeus 1.725 *** 0.608 -1.010 
 
-0.184 
 
195 
Unicredit -0.230 
 
0.589 0.721 
 
0.564 * 764 
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.263 
 
0.842 -0.041 
 
1.351 *** 764 
Banco Commmercial Portugues  0.519 * 0.023 1.715 *** 0.442 
 
764 
Banco Espirito Santo -0.110 
 
0.124 1.651 *** -0.173 
 
764 
Banco Santander -0.100 
 
2.659 *** -2.412 *** 1.977 *** 764 
BBV Argentaria -0.090 
 
1.705 *** -1.252 *** 1.299 *** 764 
Banco Popular Español 0.538 ** 1.320 *** -0.932 * 0.763 *** 764 
UBS 0.075 
 
-0.272 0.343 
 
1.607 *** 764 
Credit Suisse Group -0.252 
 
-0.142 0.751 ** 0.656 ** 764 
Nordea Bank 0.277 
 
0.934 * -0.579 
 
1.513 *** 764 
Svenska Handbkn 0.192 
 
0.227 0.240 
 
1.195 *** 764 
Swedbank  0.183 
 
0.080 -0.050 
 
1.869 *** 764 
DNB Nor 0.255 
 
0.252 0.319 
 
1.517 *** 764 
Danske Bank 0.291 
 
0.297 -0.202 
 
1.671 *** 764 
State Bank Of India 0.109 
 
-0.872 * 1.396 *** 0.338 
 
764 
Mizuho Financial Group 0.124 
 
-0.007 -0.521 ** 0.310 
 
764 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 0.092 
 
-0.300 -0.916 ** 0.655 
 
195 
Shinhan Financial Group 0.167 
 
1.140 *** -0.234 
 
1.335 *** 764 
Australia & New Zealand Banking 0.070 
 
0.515 -0.763 ** 2.150 *** 764 
HSBC Holding  -0.243 
 
2.352 *** -1.379 *** 0.822 *** 764 
Barclays -0.181 
 
-0.349 0.802 * 1.015 *** 764 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group -1.042 *** -1.621 * 0.869 
 
0.604 * 764 
Lloyds Banking Group 0.024 
 
-0.268 0.542 
 
1.307 *** 764 
Standard Chartered -0.043 
 
0.816 -0.811 
 
1.366 *** 764 
Bank of America -0.450 
 
1.355 ** -0.647 
 
0.397 
 
764 
JP Morgan Chase & Co -0.545 *** 1.228 ** -0.341 0.543 764 
Citigroup -0.484 ** 0.431 -0.295 0.528 * 764 
Wells Fargo & Co -0.145 0.896 ** -1.219 *** 1.034 *** 764 
Morgan Stanley -0.209 0.313 0.432 1.485 *** 764 
Goldman Sachs Group -0.334 * 1.958 *** -2.096 *** 0.841 *** 764 
US Bancorp 0.201 0.864 ** 0.034 1.809 *** 195 
PNC Financial Services Group -0.227 0.208 -0.887 *** 1.404 *** 764 
 
Notes:  *** 99%,  **95%,  *90% p-values.  
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